Salt Lake City v. Wade E. Clinger : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Salt Lake City v. Wade E. Clinger : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Salt Lake City Prosecutor; Attorney for Appellee.
Loni F. DeLand; Michael R. Sikora; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake City v. Clinger, No. 970743 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1260
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
WADE E. CLINGER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 970743-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appeal from the Judgment and Conviction for 
Battery, a Class B Misdemeanor, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Salt Lake Department, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Shiela McCleve, Presiding. 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862 
MICHAEL R. SIKORA (6986) 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7074 
Lawyers for Appellant 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
451 South 200 East, Suite 125 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Lawyer for Appellee 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
SEP o h ms 
Julia D'Alesartdro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
WADE E. CLINGER, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 970743-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appeal from the Judgment and Conviction for 
Battery, a Class B Misdemeanor, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Salt Lake Department, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Shiela McCleve, Presiding. 
LONI F. DeLAND (0 862 
MICHAEL R. SIKORA (6986) 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7074 
Lawyers for Appellant 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
451 South 200 East, Suite 125 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Lawyer for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES . . . . 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS . . . 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
Failure to Comply with Rule 11-301 rendered the 
conviction null and void since the law student who 
tried the case lacked the authority to prosecute 5 
1. Lack of authority to prosecute 7 
2. Failure to comply with Rule 11-301 10 
CONCLUSION 13 
ADDENDUM 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Page 
Adoption of W, 904 P. 2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 1 
Attorney General v. District Court, 844 P.2d 124 
(Nev. 1992) 8, 9 
Benbow v. State, 614 So.2d 398 (Miss. 1993) 10 
Cheatham v. State, 364 So.2d 83 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978) . . . . 10 
City of Seattle v. Ratliff, 667 P.2d 630 (Wash 1983) . . . . 10 
Gaitan v. State, 905 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) . . . . 10 
Matter of Moore, 380 N.E.2d 917 (111. 1978) 10 
State v. Baca, 688 P. 2d 34 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) 8 
State v. Daniels, 346 So.2d 672 (La. 1977) 11 
State v. Glorioso, 806 P.2d 233 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 5 
State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 1 
State ex re. Hill v. Pirtle, 887 S.W.2d 921 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994) 10 
State v. Hollenbeck, 814 P.2d 143 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1991) 8 
State v. Pittman, 829 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) 9 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 passim 
Miss. Code Ann. § 73-3-207 10 
Ordinances 
Salt Lake City Code § 11-08-020 3 
iii 
Constitutional Provisions 
Page 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, § 16 7 
Rules 
Rule 11-301, Code of Judicial Administration passim 
iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
battery, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City 
Code § 11-08-020. This Court invokes jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the law student who tried the case had the 
authority to prosecute a criminal misdemeanor trial without 
complying with Rule 11-301 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. This is an issue of law and will be reviewed 
under the correction of error standard affording no deference to 
the trial court. Adoption of W, 904 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (standard of review on jurisdictional issues). 
Further, appellant contends that it was plain error to permit the 
law student to prosecute without authority. To establish plain 
error, appellant must show (1) an error exists, (2) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is 
harmful. State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 11-301. Law student assistance. 
Intent. To ensure the provision of competent legal 
services. 
To increase the opportunity of law students to have 
first-hand contact with the legal system and participate 
directly in the court process. 
1 
Applicability. This rule shall apply to the bar, the 
judiciary and to law students. 
Statement of the Rule. Subject to the inherent power of 
each judge to have direct control of the proceedings in 
court and the conduct of attorneys and others who appear 
before the judge, the courts of this state are authorized to 
allow law students to participate in matters pending before 
them, provided: 
(A) The student's participation is limited to civil and 
misdemeanor cases; 
(B) The student has completed legal studies amounting to 
at least four (4) semesters or the equivalent if the school 
is not on a semester basis; 
(C) The student's participation is under the direct and 
immediate personal supervision and in the presence of a 
resident attorney admitted to practice law before the court, 
except the presence of a resident attorney shall not be 
required at default divorce proceedings which are not 
contested and where the appearing party is represented by a 
non-profit public service legal agency; 
(D) The student's participation is agreed to by written 
stipulation of counsel for all parties to the action and 
filed in the case file; 
(E) The student does not receive any compensation or 
remuneration of any kind from the client on whose behalf the 
services are rendered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928. Attorney duties--Deputy public 
prosecutor 
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney may 
prosecute violations of city ordinances, and under state 
law, infractions and misdemeanors occurring within the 
boundaries of the municipality and has the same powers in 
respect to violations as are exercised by a county attorney 
or district attorney, except that a city attorney's 
authority to grant immunity shall be limited to granting 
transactional immunity for violations of city ordinances, 
and under state law, infractions, and misdemeanors occurring 
within the boundaries of the municipality. The city 
attorney shall represent the interests of the state or the 
municipality in the appeal of any matter prosecuted in any 
trial court by the city attorney. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Wade dinger was convicted of battery, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11-08-020. 
The case was tried without a jury. The trial court sentenced 
dinger to a term of probation of one year which included 
domestic violence counseling and twenty-five hours of community 
service. (R. 10) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During a bench trial on November 18, 1997, Wade dinger was 
convicted of battery under the Salt Lake City Code. The Salt 
Lake City Prosecutor's Office was the prosecuting agency. (Trial 
Transcript of 11-18-97 at 3, 34) [Hereinafter "Trans."] 
The person who prosecuted the case was a woman named Amy 
Hugie, a law student practicing under Utah's law student 
assistant rule, a rule which permits qualified law students to 
appear in court under the direct supervision of a supervising 
attorney. (Trans, at 3; Rule 11-301, Code of Judicial 
Administration) However, the "Appearances" page of the trial 
transcript incorrectly refers to Ms. Hugie as an "Attorney at 
Law." (Trans, at 2) 
When the judge called the matter for trial, she stated "I am 
not sure who is going to prosecute this case." Ms. Hugie 
answered that she would be prosecuting, with the court's 
permission. The judge then replied, "under the direction of 
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(inaudible)." (R. 3) That short discussion was the extent of 
any attempt to comply with Rule 11-301. 
In the Index of Proceedings prepared by the district court, 
which was made part of the record but is not identified by a 
record number, the entry on November 18, 1997, shows that Mike 
Zabriskie represented the city. Mr. Zabriskie's name is never 
mentioned in the trial transcript nor does he make an appearance 
of counsel. There is no record evidence that Mr. Zabriskie was 
in the courtroom during the trial and supervising Ms. Hugie. 
Further, the record does not contain a written stipulation, 
signed by both parties, permitting Ms. Hugie to proceed on behalf 
of Salt Lake City and the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The bench trial was prosecuted by a law student practicing 
under Rule 11-301 of the Code of Judicial Administration. The 
court file contains no written stipulation, signed by both 
parties, permitting the law student to participate in court. 
Further, there is no record evidence that the law student was 
supervised during trial by a supervising attorney who, under the 
explicit language of the rule, is required to be present in the 
courtroom. dinger was convicted of the charged offense. 
Because the law student had no authority to prosecute the case 
the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by permitting the trial 
to go forward. Accordingly, the conviction must be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
Failure to Comply with Rule 11-3 01 rendered the 
conviction null and void since the law student who 
tried the case lacked the authority to prosecute. 
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by authorizing a 
student intern to conduct dinger's bench trial without requiring 
compliance with the law student assistance rule, Rule 11-301 of 
the Code of Judicial Administration. Accordingly, dinger's 
conviction cannot stand since the parties never agreed by written 
stipulation to permit the student to prosecute the case, and the 
record evidence does not indicate that the prosecuting attorney 
was actually in the courtroom and supervising the student intern. 
The statutory authority for a city attorney to prosecute the 
violation of city ordinances is found in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
928 (1996). A law student intern who meets the criteria of Rule 
11-301 is permitted to assist in a criminal misdemeanor case as 
an arm of the city attorney's office. dinger argues that if the 
criteria of Rule 11-301 is not met, then the law student who 
prosecuted him had no authority to do so, and the conviction 
cannot stand.1 Rule 11-301 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
1
 Only one Utah case has reviewed Rule 11-301. In State v. 
Glorioso, 806 P.2d 233 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the state moved to 
permit a law student to argue the appeal from a conviction for a 
second degree felony. The court denied the motion, concluding 
that it had no authority to permit the law student to argue since 
a law student's participation under the rule is limited to civil 
and misdemeanor cases. Id. The difference between Glorioso and 
the circumstances presented in this appeal is that in Glorioso 
compliance with the rule would never have been possible. In this 
case, compliance may have been possible but was never 
5 
Intent. To ensure the provision of competent legal 
services. 
To increase the opportunity of law students to have 
first-hand contact with the legal system and participate 
directly in the court process. 
Applicability. This rule shall apply to the bar, the 
judiciary and to law students. 
Statement of the Rule. Subject to the inherent power of 
each judge to have direct control of the proceedings in 
court and the conduct of attorneys and others who appear 
before the judge, the courts of this state are authorized to 
allow law students to participate in matters pending before 
them, provided: 
(A) The student's participation is limited to civil and 
misdemeanor cases; 
(B) The student has completed legal studies amounting to 
at least four (4) semesters or the equivalent if the school 
is not on a semester basis; 
(C) The student's participation is under the direct and 
immediate personal supervision and in the presence of a 
resident attorney admitted to practice law before the court, 
except the presence of a resident attorney shall not be 
required at default divorce proceedings which are not 
contested and where the appearing party is represented by a 
non-profit public service legal agency; 
(D) The student's participation is agreed to by written 
stipulation of counsel for all parties to the action and 
filed in the case file; 
Several aspects of the rule are relevant to this appeal. 
First, the rule makes no distinction between defense-oriented and 
prosecution-oriented activities. The mandate of the rule applies 
accomplished, thereby corrupting the legitimacy of the 
conviction. The case was not tried by a person with 
prosecutorial authority. 
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whether a law student is an intern for the prosecution or the 
defense. Second, under the rule direct and immediate supervision 
by a supervising attorney is required and the supervising 
attorney must be present in court with the law student. Finally, 
all parties to the action must agree by written stipulation to 
the student's participation and the stipulation must be filed in 
the record. In this case, the second and third aspects noted 
above were never complied with and, therefore, pursuant to 
section 10-3-98, the law student had no authority to prosecute 
the case as a deputy or agent of the city attorney's office. 
Hence, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by permitting 
the law student to proceed. 
1. Lack of authority to prosecute. 
Since this issue involves the lack of authority to prosecute 
because of the failure to comply with Rule 11-301, the situation 
is analogous to the appointment of a special prosecutor pursuant 
to a statute or constitutional provision. For example, in Utah 
"the Supreme Court shall have power to appoint a prosecutor pro 
tempore." Utah Constitution, Article VIII, §16. So long as the 
appointment of a lawyer outside the prosecuting attorney's office 
is properly made pursuant to law, the special prosecutor has the 
authority to go forward with the case and the court has 
jurisdiction to hear it. Of course, this presumes that the 
lawyer appointed is in fact a member of the bar in good standing. 
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However, in State v. Hollenbeck, 814 P.2d 143, 145 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1991), the defendant's conviction for criminal sexual 
penetration was reversed because the special prosecutor was not 
appointed under the specific procedures outlined by statute. In 
Hollenbeck, an attorney working for the Medicaid Providers Fraud 
Control Unit, an office or agency funded by the New Mexico 
legislature, prosecuted a sexual penetration case for a local 
district attorney. The appellate court held that under 
applicable statute and the circumstances of the case, the special 
prosecuting attorney did not have the authority to prosecute and 
thus the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Under the statute, 
special assistants could be appointed only for ethical reasons or 
other good cause. Id. Noting first that "we do not presume the 
legislature enacted a useless statute," Id., the court observed 
that "[t]he rationale for requiring authorization for prosecution 
is to avoid prosecution by persons who are not held accountable 
or subject to the oath of office." See also State v. Baca, 688 
P.2d 34 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (holding in criminal case court 
obtains no jurisdiction over an action brought without authority 
and that if person who has no authority to prosecute does 
prosecute, court will lack jurisdiction). 
The issue of authority to prosecute under a special 
prosecutor appointment was further explored by the Nevada Supreme 
Court in Attorney General v. District Court, 844 P.2d 124 (Nev. 
1992). That case held that the trial court had exceeded its 
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jurisdiction when, after disqualifying the district attorney's 
office on a murder case, it assigned the case to the attorney 
general. Under Nevada law, the attorney general does not have 
the statutory authority to act as special prosecutor. Id. at 
125. See also State v. Pittman, 829 S.W.2d 897, 899-900 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1992) (holding assistant county attorney lacked 
statutory authority to bring appeal in criminal matter on behalf 
of state). Hence, the Nevada case articulates three principles. 
First, a lawyer has no authority to prosecute a case unless such 
authority stems directly from some statute, rule, or 
constitutional provision. Second, a trial judge exceeds his or 
her jurisdiction by changing the rules from which the authority 
to prosecute derives. Third, if a trial judge permits 
prosecution by a person not authorized to prosecute, the trial 
court loses jurisdiction of the matter. 
The concept of authority to prosecute not only touches the 
jurisdictional issue, but is also significant because authority 
to prosecute involves important public responsibilities and 
political accountability for the conduct of the prosecuting 
agency. Accordingly, one court has recognized how essential it 
is for a prosecuting agency to maintain control over a criminal 
prosecution. Thus, in the State of Texas 
[a] district attorney may appoint any duly licensed 
attorney to assist him in prosecuting a criminal case 
"as long as the district or county attorney does not 
relinquish control of or responsibility for such 
prosecution. Control over the prosecution logically 
9 
includes the presence of the district or county 
attorney or an assistant district or assistant county 
attorney, respectively, in the courtroom during all 
phases of the trial." 
Gaitan v. State, 905 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), 
quoting State ex re. Hill v. Pirtle, 887 S.W.2d 921, 932-33 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1994) (Maloney, J., concurring). 
2. Failure to comply with Rule 11-301. 
By failing to make either strict or substantial compliance 
with the law student assistance rule, the student intern had no 
authority to prosecute the case and dinger's conviction must be 
vacated. The court in Cheatham v. State, 364 So.2d 83, 84 (Fla. 
Ct. App. 1978), reversed a conviction for aggravated assault 
because the defendant had not been informed that the person 
representing him was a legal intern nor was the intern adequately 
supervised by an attorney as required under Florida law. See 
also Matter of Moore, 380 N.E.2d 917, 920 (111. 1978) (holding no 
compliance with Illinois rule permitting law students to 
practice; civil judgment vacated because there was no written 
consent form in the record and respondent was not aware he was 
represented by a law student); City of Seattle v. Ratliff, 667 
P.2d 630, 633 (Wash 1983) (law student who is authorized to 
practice only under certain conditions may be considered counsel 
only when he or she complies with those conditions); Benbow v. 
State, 614 So.2d 398, 403 (Miss. 1993) (requiring full compliance 
with Miss. Code Ann. § 73-3-207, which specifies the conditions 
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under which law students may practice; conviction reversed on 
Sixth Amendment grounds). 
Even if only substantial compliance with Rule 11-301 is 
required, the parameters of substantial compliance must still be 
defined. State v. Daniels, 346 So.2d 672 (La. 1977), provides a 
good example of substantial compliance with a law student 
practice rule. In Daniels, the supervising defense attorney in a 
criminal case obtained the defendant's written consent to be 
represented by law students and the consent form was then filed 
in the record. Later, however, another supervising attorney was 
later substituted for the original supervising attorney, and the 
defendant's consent was obtained orally on the record. The 
Daniels court rejected defendant's claim that this violated the 
Louisiana rule permitting law students to participate in trial 
work, and held that there was substantial compliance with the 
rule. Id. at 674. 
The facts in dinger's appeal simply do not demonstrate 
substantial compliance with Rule 11-301, and therefore the law 
student had no authority to prosecute under section 10-3-928. It 
is undisputed that the record does not contain a stipulation 
signed by both parties agreeing to the participation of the law 
student. Next, a brief discussion on the record just prior to 
trial identifies the parties and their representatives: 
THE COURT: Salt Lake City v. Wade Clinger. Are we 
ready? 
MR. LARSEN: We are, your honor, Larry Larsen for Mr. 
11 
dinger. 
THE COURT: Thank You. Mr. Clinger is present. . . . 
and I am not sure who is going to prosecute the case. Let's 
get appearances. 
MS. HUGIE: Amy Hugie, Your Honor, I will be 
prosecuting this case 
THE COURT 
MS. HUGIE 
THE COURT 
MS. HUGIE 
THE COURT 
Okay. 
With your permission. 
Okay, so (inaudible) 
For the prosecution. 
Under the direction of (inaudible) 
(Transcript of November 18, 1997 at 3) In addition, page 2 of 
the transcript lists the appearances and refers only to Amy Hugie 
as representing the city. However, in the Index of Proceedings 
prepared by district court, which was made part of the record but 
is not identified by a record number, the entry on November 18, 
1997, shows that Mike Zabriskie represented the city. Mr. 
Zabriskie's name is never mentioned in the trial transcript nor 
does he make an appearance. Based on the discussion quoted 
above, an the transcript taken in its entirety, it does not 
appear that Mr. Zabriskie was even in the courtroom when the 
judge called the case and asked for appearances. Accordingly, 
there was a complete failure to comply with the requirements of 
Rule 11-301 and Ms. Hugie had no legal authority to prosecute the 
case. The conviction cannot stand since it does not flow 
directly from the authority vested in city prosecutors as set 
forth in section 10-3-928. The trial court exceeded its 
jurisdiction by proceeding without a written stipulation signed 
by both parties and in the absence of a city prosecutor licensed 
to practice law in Utah. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Clinger 
requests this Court to reverse the judgment of conviction. 
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Are we ready? 
MR. 
for Mr. Clinger. 
THE 
present. Do you 
November 18, 1997 
COURT: 
LARSEN: 
COURT: 
have a 
Salt Lake City vs. Wade Clinger. 
We are, Your Honor, Larry Larsen 
Thank you. Mr. Clinger 
copy of the Information < 
one count of battery, unlawful force or force or 
is 
alleging 
violence 
upon the person of another at 418 Edith Avenue on December 
11 of '96, and I 
case. Let's get 
MS. 
am not sure who is going to prosecute the 
appearances. 
HUGIE: 
prosecuting the case. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
(inaudible). Do 
COURT: 
HUGIE: 
COURT: 
HUGIE: 
COURT: 
Amy Hugie, Your Honor, 
Okay. 
With your permission. 
Okay, so (inaudible) 
For the prosecution. 
Under the direction of 
I will be 
you have a copy of the information, Mr. 
Larsen, and I indicated 
assume you are prepared 
MR. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
LARSEN: 
COURT: 
HUGIE: 
COURT: 
to you what the charges 
to go ahead? 
I am prepared. 
Is the City prepared? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
are. I 
Okay. Go ahead, Ms. Hugie, then, 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT DIVISON II STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
WADE E. CLINGER ] 
Defendant, ) 
) INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS 
1 CASE NO. 961025856 MC 
1 CASE NO. 970743-CA 
September 23, 1997 Honorable Sheila K. McCleve was presiding. The defendant was 
Tape 1967 Count 430 present without counsel. Mike Zabriskie was present on behalf of the 
city. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. A bench trial was set 
for November 18, 1997. 
November 18, 1997 Honorable Sheila K. McCleve was presiding. The defendant was 
Tape 2369 Count 1750 present with counsel. Mike Zabriskie was present on behalf of the city. 
Susan Clinger was sworn and testified on behalf of the city. City rests. 
The defendant was sworn and testified. The defendant rests. The court 
heard closing arguments. The court finds the defendant guilty as 
charged. The defendant was sentenced to 180 days jail suspended and a 
$1,850.00 fine suspended. The defendant is to complete 25 hours of 
community service. The defendant is on 12 months good behavior 
probation. A review hearing is set for November 25, 1997. 
November 25, 1997 Honorable Sheila K. McCleve was presiding. The defendant was 
Tape 2474 present without counsel. Mike Zabriskie was present on behalf of the 
city. The defendant requested a later review date because he will be out 
of the country. The review hearing was continued to February 3, 1998. 
